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This paper demonstrates that factors which impede labour market adjustments can
have ﬁrst-order impacts on aggregate output and social welfare. While several studies
ﬁnd that individual workers can face large and persistent sectoral reallocation costs,
this paper shows that these costs are important at the aggregate level. I use a search
and matching model to isolate and quantify two factors that contribute to the costly
and time-consuming adjustment process: search frictions and an inability to transfer
match-speciﬁc skills to new jobs.
I apply the model to examine Canada’s sectoral labour adjustment after a global
increase in commodity prices and associated exchange rate appreciation. These devel-
opments reorganized production to the resource sector and away from manufacturing.
The model quantitatively captures both the sectoral employment and wage eﬀects and
the response of unemployment to changes in unemployment beneﬁts. The model esti-
mates that the costs of adjustment are economically important, accounting for up to
three percent of output during the transition. These costs arise mainly in the ﬁrst three
years after the shock and are due largely to non-transferable skills. Finally, the analy-
sis reveals important policy implications. Because changes to unemployment beneﬁts
aﬀect sectors diﬀerently, these changes impact the economy’s sectoral composition and
aggregate productivity.
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This paper applies an equilibrium search and matching model to study the sectoral labour
adjustment in Canada following a global commodity price shock and associated exchange rate
appreciation. I use the model to quantify the magnitude and sources of adjustment costs in
the most aﬀected sectors. The results suggest impediments to the adjustment process — due
to search frictions and non-transferable skills — are economically signiﬁcant, imposing costs
of up to three percent of output during the transition. I also analyze the impacts of increased
unemployment beneﬁts in the model. I ﬁnd that this policy change lowers social welfare and
prolongs the adjustment process. However, because production is reallocated towards more
productive sectors, aggregate productivity increases.
This application of the model is motivated by the rapid and persistent relative price
changes that began in 2002 (commodity prices and exchange rates) and aﬀected the sectoral
compositions of many countries. Canada’s adjustment is particularly attractive to study
because it features a dramatic sectoral labour reallocation due to large employment shares
in the resource and manufacturing sectors — both of which were highly responsive to these
developments. This episode exempliﬁes a common situation where policymakers face pressure
to ease the burden on the individuals and sectors that disproportionately bear the costs
of adjustment. However, while empirical labour studies provide convincing evidence that
individual workers who lose their jobs and/or change sectors during sectoral adjustments can
suﬀer large and persistent earnings losses, it is unclear exactly how large these costs are for
the most aﬀected sectors and the aggregate economy.1 If these costs are indeed signiﬁcant,
then it is important to understand whether labour market policy can mitigate these costs.
Addressing these issues is the subject of this paper.
I study these issues by applying a model that extends Pissarides (2000) to include mul-
tisector search and skill acquisition through on-the-job training. In the model, adjustment
costs arise because of two factors which impede a perfectly-ﬂexible adjustment. The ﬁrst
factor is the standard search friction, where reallocation requires resources and time for ﬁrms
1For earnings eﬀects U.S. evidence, see e.g. McLaughlin and Bils (2001), Fallick (1996), Jacobson et al.
(1993), Topel (1993). For Canadian evidence, see Morissette et al. (2007) and Galarneau and Stratychuk
(2002). Treﬂer (2004), which analysis the impacts of the Canada U.S. Free Trade Agreement, suggests that
the transitional costs of labour adjustment may have been signiﬁcant for the Canadian manufacturing sector.
1and workers to locate appropriate partners before new production can begin. The second
obstacle to adjustment is that skills accumulated in one job may not be fully transferable to
new jobs. In addition, acquiring skills in subsequent jobs is costly and its success is uncertain.
In analyzing the labour force and payroll data to document Canada’s adjustment, I ﬁnd
that employment shifted towards the resource sector and away from manufacturing. Resource
sector employment rose because of increased hiring and retention rates, while in manufactur-
ing, labour turnover stagnated due to fewer hirings and separations. Finally, wage gains were
concentrated in the resource sector, and particularly in the upper end of the distribution.
To account for the inter-sectoral movement of workers in the data, the model’s adjustment
mechanism uses a reservation wage eﬀect. In the resource sector, the relative increase in
output per worker raises proﬁts, encourages job creation and increases wages. Because the
unemployed search simultaneously in the resource and manufacturing sectors, this increases
the value of search, causing workers to raise their reservation (and ultimately, their bargained)
wages. More expensive labour costs act as a negative spillover, discouraging job creation in
the manufacturing sector. Over time, sectoral labour reallocation occurs because there are
more vacancies in the resource sector and fewer vacancies in the manufacturing sector.
The model quantitatively captures key features of the adjustment, such as the sectoral
employment eﬀects and relative wage eﬀects among high and low-skill workers in the resource
sector. I use the model to isolate the contributions of search frictions and skill transferability
to the aggregate costs of adjustment. These costs are signiﬁcant, occur mainly in the ﬁrst
three years after the shock and are largely attributable to the non-transferability of skills.
To address these labour adjustments costs, a policy response often advocated is to com-
pensate displaced workers with increased unemployment beneﬁts. Using the model to an-
alyze such a response reveals important policy implications. In the model, more generous
unemployment beneﬁts lower aggregate employment, output, and social welfare and raise un-
employment incidence and duration. These results are standard in a search model and occur
because unemployment becomes less costly, so workers raise their reservation (and bargained)
wages. This, in turn, discourages job creation and prolongs the adjustment process. Changes
to unemployment beneﬁts aﬀect sectors diﬀerently and may have unexpected consequences.
For instance, because the job discouraging eﬀect is stronger in less productive sectors, the
2sectoral composition of the remaining jobs shifts favorably towards more productive sectors.
As a result, in the model, more generous unemployment beneﬁts raise aggregate productivity.
Finally, it is important to emphasize that in the example considered, even though it is not a
target of the calibration, the model’s unemployment rate response to changes in unemploy-
ment beneﬁts is consistent with estimates from empirical studies.2 Matching this feature of
the data has been problematic for the baseline one-sector model.3
While unemployment beneﬁts aﬀect productivity in other search models, the mechanism
here is diﬀerent. In Acemoglu (2001), unemployment beneﬁts help mitigate a hold-up problem
because ﬁrms make capital investments prior to matching. Furthermore, in Acemoglu and
Shimer (2000), unemployment beneﬁts encourage riskier search strategies. The basic intuition
for the mechanism in this paper carries over from recent controversy for the one-sector model.4
A shock of a given size – in this case, an increase in workers’ reservation wages – has a larger
impact when the match surplus is smaller. As less productive sectors have smaller surpluses,
their vacancy/job creation decisions are aﬀected more than those of high productivity sectors.
My quantitative cost estimates of labour adjustment relate to results by Lee and Wolpin
(2006).5 In their counterfactual experiments, removing inter-sectoral mobility costs raised the
average annual growth rate of aggregate U.S. output by 1.2 percent over their sample. Given
that I focus on the most aﬀected sectors after a particularly dramatic shock, my estimated
cost of 2.8 percent output in the ﬁrst year after the shock is reasonable. Finally, my results
also relate to an empirical literature that uses regression analysis to study employment and
wage responses to exchange rate movements.6 The model here provides a more explicit
account of the mechanism by which employment and unemployment adjust following shocks,
captures the equilibrium wage and employment interactions between sectors, and permits
policy and welfare analysis.
2See Nickell and Laynard (1999); and Costain and Reiter (2006).
3See Hornstein, Krusell, and Violante (2005); Costain and Reiter (2006); Silva and Toledo (2007).
4See, among others, Shimer (2005a); Hagedorn and Manovskii (2006); and Mortensen and Nagyp´ al (2007).
5A key diﬀerence is that my model focuses on search frictions, training and unemployment, while their
model features a complex modeling of occupation and education choices.
6See for example, Leung and Yuen (2005), Campa and Goldberg (2001) and Burgess and Knetter (1998).
32 Documenting Canada’s Labour Market Adjustment
This section presents some empirical facts from the labour adjustment following the recent
increase in commodity prices and associated Canadian exchange rate appreciation.
2.1 Energy Price Shock and Associated Exchange Rate Movement
Figure 1 shows global commodity prices rose dramatically starting in 2002, led by strong
gains in energy prices. The energy component of the Bank of Canada’s Commodity Price
Index doubled in 2002 and rose 300 percent during 2002–2005.
Empirical evidence that ﬁnds the Canadian exchange rate responds to movements in
commodity and energy prices, particularly in the long-run.7 As suggested by this relationship,
Figure 2 shows a concurrent, persistent increase in Canada’s nominal eﬀective exchange rate.8
While several factors undoubtedly contributed to these shocks, a signiﬁcant part of this
global commodity price increase is attributable to stronger demand — as opposed to earlier
episodes in the 1970s which were driven more by reduced supply. This stronger demand is
concentrated in developing Asian economies where commodities and energy are a key input
to the industrialization process which is rapidly expanding manufactured goods production.
This phenomenon is illustrated by the fact that developing Asian economies accounted for 63
percent of the global growth in primary energy consumption during 2001–2006.9 For the pur-
poses of this paper, however, identifying the sources of these shocks are not important. What
matters is simply that these changes had diﬀerential impacts on productivity in particular
sectors, beginning in 2002.
2.2 Asymmetric Sectoral Responses Expected
Commodity and exchange rate movements generally impact sectors of the economy diﬀer-
ently. The exogenous increase in commodity demand and energy prices has clear beneﬁts
7See Amano and Van Norden (1995); Chen and Rogoﬀ (2003); Issa, Lafrance and Murray (2006) and
Bayoumi and M¨ uhleisen (2006). This literature ﬁnds that real non-energy commodity export prices are
associated with an appreciation of the Canada-U.S. real exchange rate over the post-Bretton Woods era.
Real energy prices are also associated with a stronger Canadian dollar, since the early 1990’s.
8Canada’s real eﬀective exchange rate tracks the nominal series almost exactly after 1992, because the
consumer price index has been stable relative to nominal exchange rates movements, see Ong (2006).
9Author’s calculations from BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2007, available at: www.bp.com.
4for the Canadian resource sector, which can now sell more output at a higher price since
demand is inelastic, in the short run. Conversely, sectors with more energy-intensive pro-
duction, such as manufacturing, will be adversely aﬀected by higher energy input costs. For
example, using detailed plant-level data, Davis and Haltiwanger (2001) ﬁnd that within the
U.S. manufacturing sector, employment falls more at more energy-intensive plants following
positive oil price shocks.
At the same time, the associated ‘exchange rate shock’ will similarly generate sectoral
winners and losers. Table 1 reports trade exposure estimates, which are a useful proxy for
Canadian sectors’ sensitivity to exchange rate movements. The table shows that the Canadian
manufacturing sector stands to be the most adversely impacted by the appreciation. In 2002,
it had the highest trade exposure measure, 0.76, since roughly half of its ﬁnal goods are
exported, and imports make up nearly half of the domestic market. However, manufacturers
beneﬁt more than other sectors on the cost side because they import nearly one-quarter of
their inputs. The resource sector was about as exposed as the overall Canadian economy’s
private sector (0.50 versus 0.48 respectively). The direct eﬀects of an appreciation on services
will likely be more modest because they trade less internationally.
The Bank of Canada’s Business Outlook Survey provides evidence of the impact the
appreciation on Canadian ﬁrms (Mair, 2005). More than three-quarters of manufacturing
ﬁrms reported adverse eﬀects from the appreciation, mainly from lower proﬁt margins on
foreign sales. Firms reportedly responded to the appreciation by cutting labor and other costs
and attempting to increase productivity. Leung and Yuen (2005) provide empirical evidence
of signiﬁcant labour market adjustments in response to real exchange rate movements for
Canadian manufacturing industries during 1981–1997. They ﬁnd Canadian appreciations are
associated with falling labour input in manufacturing. Overall then, this evidence suggests
resource employment gains and manufacturing employment losses following the shock.
2.3 Labour Adjustment
Fact 1: Employment shifted from manufacturing to the resource sector following the shock.
Canadian data from both the payroll and labour force surveys provide stark evidence of
sectoral labour reallocation since 2002. The strongest employment growth was in the resource
5sector (mining, oil and gas), while the biggest employment losses were in manufacturing.
Figure 3 shows the employment dynamics from the Survey of Employment, Payroll and
Hours data. In the ﬁve years after the shock, resource sector employment rose more than 35
percent. This was more than double the growth in the rest of the Canadian economy, even
after excluding the poor performance in manufacturing, where employment fell more than
six percent. As a result, the sectoral composition of employment shifted from manufacturing
to resources. Such sectoral reallocation can potentially have aggregate impacts, given the
sizeable diﬀerences in output per worker observed across sectors in Canada prior to the shock
(Figure 4). Canada’s sectoral reallocation is typical of the general labour adjustment over this
period in developed economies in North America, Western Europe and the Paciﬁc.10 This
evidence suggests a broader global structural reallocation of manufacturing employment to
developing Asia.
Fact 2: The resource sector employment boom featured increased hiring and retention rates.
In manufacturing, labour turnover stagnated as both job-ﬁnding and separation rates fell.
While these employment changes are readily observable, how they were achieved is not.
Firms have two extensive margins to adjust their workforce: hiring and ﬁring. To examine
the relative importance of these two margins, I estimate job-ﬁnding and separation rates in
each sector as follows. The employment change is the diﬀerence between inﬂows and outﬂows:
∆ei,t = fi,tui,t − si,tei,t (1)
where ∆ei,t is the employment change in sector i at time t; u is unemployment; and f and s
are the job-ﬁnding and separation rates. I estimate total outﬂows by aggregating individuals’
employment-to-unemployment transitions using Labour Force Survey microdata. Given the
employment and unemployment series, equation (1) gives the job-ﬁnding and separation rate
estimates. Note the job-ﬁnding estimates assume that all net inﬂows into the sector were
from unemployment rather than labour force inactivity or job-to-job transitions from other
sectors.
Figure 5 shows the results for the resource sector. Both series are expressed in logarithms
and identically-scaled so their relative movements are directly comparable.11 The resource
10I ﬁnd similar results for resources and manufacturing employment using U.S., Australian and New Zealand
data; Macdonald (2007) notes signiﬁcant manufacturing employment losses in the U.K. and Germany.
11Elsby et al. (2007) stress the appropriate comparison is the relative, rather than absolute changes in these
6sector increased its employment by retaining existing workers and hiring new ones. The
monthly job-ﬁnding rate in the resource sector rose from 28 percent in 2002 to 36 percent in
2006. The relative drop in the monthly rate of job separations into unemployment was even
larger, falling from 3.5 percent to 2.2 percent.
Figure 6 shows that in the manufacturing sector, ﬁrms did not increase ﬁrings, they simply
slowed hiring. This is perhaps the least costly way to reduce employment since ﬁrms avoid
ﬁring costs, such as severance packages to unionized workers, and also save on recruiting
and hiring costs. The entire employment adjustment in the manufacturing sector, therefore,
came through a sharp drop in the job-ﬁnding rate, which fell from 32 percent in 2002 to 20
percent in 2005. Interestingly, there was actually a slight drop in manufacturing separations
into unemployment, from 1.8 to 1.7 percent. I have disaggregated the data further into
worker-initiated quits and ﬁrm-initiated layoﬀs; neither rose after the shock. Thus, there
was a so-called ‘chill’ in the manufacturing sector as labour turnover slowed. Gourinchas
(1999) ﬁnds similar results using ﬁrm-level data on French manufacturers. Following a real
appreciation, the job creation margin was much more responsive than the job destruction
margin. This result is counter to the prediction of his model, and he suggests, “should shift
the focus of future discussions towards the entry margin.” (p. 1314). This conclusion leads me
to model job separations as exogenous and focus on job creation. My ﬁnding of a sharp drop
in job-ﬁnding when the labour market in manufacturing weakened is consistent with previous
research for the Canadian economy. For instance, Picot and Heisz (2000) ﬁnd similar results
during the weak labour market in ﬁrst half of the 1990s, and Picot et al. (1998) ﬁnd hires
are more cyclically sensitive than permanent layoﬀs over 1978–1993.
Unfortunately, no reliable data are available for vacancies or job training expenditures in
Canada at the sectoral level.12 Nonetheless, it is reasonable to expect that vacancy posting is
closely related to ﬁrm’s implied hiring behavior, reported above, and proﬁtability. Both rose
strongly in resources, suggesting an increase in resource sector vacancies. In manufacturing,
I estimate hiring fell sharply, while proﬁt data show little change over this period, suggesting
rates. Using the U.S. data they argue that using absolute changes, as in Shimer (2005b), leads to erroneous
interpretations of the relative contribution of each margin to unemployment ﬂuctuations.
12The usual proxy for ﬁrms’ recruiting intensity, the Help Wanted Index, is no longer available for Canada.
After 2003, the Conference Board stopped collecting it because job posting increasingly uses the Internet, so
the print space devoted to employment ads is no longer a useful indicator of ﬁrms’ recruiting eﬀorts.
7weak vacancy posting activity. Finally, if workers require training to operate new machinery
and equipment (M&E), then M&E per worker provides a proxy for training. During 2002–
2006, M&E per worker rose by 25 percent in resources and only 6 percent in manufacturing.
This suggests a much stronger increase in resource training relative to manufacturing.
2.4 Wage Adjustment
Fact 3: Resource sector workers enjoyed the largest wage gains after the shock, with workers
in the upper end of the wage distribution beneﬁtting the most.
Table 2 reports the gains in real hourly wages and annual wages between 2001, the year
before the shock, and 2006, the latest available data.13 I report the quartiles to highlight the
diﬀerences within a given sector along the wage distribution. Since the shock, real average
annual wages of resource workers increased by over $5,400 (in 2001 Canadian dollars). While
the entire distribution beneﬁtted, the gains were concentrated in the upper end.14 Also see
Figure 7, which plots the estimated resource sector wage distribution.
Real wage growth in the manufacturing sector was more modest, though still substantial,
averaging roughly $1,600. As opposed to the resource sector, gains in the lower and upper
quartiles were roughly equal. Figure 8 plots the estimated wage distribution.
3 Multisector Search Model with Training
This section brieﬂy describes the model of sectoral labour adjustment.15 There are two key
extensions to a discrete time version of Pissarides’ (2000, Ch. 1) baseline search and matching
labour model. The ﬁrst is multisector search which links labour market conditions across
sectors and gives rise to sectoral wage and hiring spillovers (inter-sectoral labour reallocation).
The second extension is on-the-job training and skill acquisition. This ampliﬁes the model’s
response to productivity shocks through endogenous shifts in the skill composition of the
labour force (intra-sectoral labour reallocation).
13Similar results hold for weekly earnings and when restricting the sample to full-time employees.
14Other studies for the U.S. using NLSY micro panel data ﬁnd that oil price increases raised the relative
wages of skilled workers. (Keane and Prasad, 1996).
15See Tapp (2007) for an extended discussion, equilibrium derivations and proofs.
83.1 Environment
Time is discrete with an inﬁnite horizon. To simplify the exposition, there is no aggregate
uncertainty to focus on the model’s steady-state. There are multiple sectors of the economy
indexed by i ∈ {1,2,...,I} that produce a non-storable good. The model features a measure
one continuum of potential workers and a continuum of ﬁrms. Each type of agent is ex ante
identical, inﬁnitely-lived and risk-neutral, discounting future payoﬀs at rate δ. Agents are
either matched and productive, or searching for a partner to begin production.
Workers: Unemployed workers receive beneﬁts, z, each period and search for jobs si-
multaneously in all sectors at no cost. There is no on-the-job search or quits.16 Workers
maximize the expected present value of their lifetime income subject to the random arrival
of job oﬀers when unemployed. There are no savings in the model; workers simply consume
their current income.
Firms: Before production can occur, ﬁrms must post vacancies to attract unemployed
workers. There is free entry and exit of vacancies, which incur recruiting cost, c, each period.
When matched with a worker, production begins as a low-skill match. Firms can train
low-skill workers on the job. Training costs the ﬁrm τ(ti) each period and increases the
probability the match becomes high-skill, which is λiti, where λi is the skill arrival rate and
ti is training. Skills are match-speciﬁc and therefore are lost when the match terminates,
which occurs with probability si each period.
Production: Matches produce output using only labour with constant returns to scale,
skill-speciﬁc technologies. Each period sector i matches produce: ySK
i = AipSK
i lSK
i , where y
is output; i ∈ {1,2,...,I} subscripts the sector; SK ∈ {L,H} superscripts low and high-skill
matches; Ai is a sector-speciﬁc shock; p is productivity, with pH
i > pL
i ; and l is labour. Each
ﬁrm employs one worker.
Matching: Matching functions determine the number of pairwise matches per period in
each sector. The matching functions have the Cobb-Douglas functional form: mi(u,vi) =
µiuαv
1−α
i , where mi is the measure of sector i matches; u is the measure of unemployed
workers; vi is the measure of vacancies in sector i; µi is the recruiting eﬀectiveness in sector
16Osberg (1991) ﬁnds a signiﬁcant number of Canadian workers changing sectors experience an interven-
ing unemployment spell. The model abstracts from job-to-job transitions, as all transitions occur through
unemployment.
9i; and α is the elasticity of matches with respect to unemployment. Because the model is set
in discrete, rather than continuous time, we need to avoid complications arising from workers
receiving more than one oﬀer in a period.17 To do so, the number of matches in each sector
is determined at the start of the matching process. Then pairwise matches are randomly
allocated. Once a pair is matched, they exit to bargain. Matching rates are determined
in equilibrium and, in general, will vary by sector. Let θi ≡
vi
u denote market tightness in
sector i from the ﬁrm’s perspective; fi(θi) =
mi
u denotes an unemployed worker’s job-ﬁnding
probability in sector i;18 and qi(θi) =
mi
vi denotes the job-ﬁlling probability for a sector i
vacancy, where
PI
i=1 fi(θi),q(θi) ∈ [0,1]. Finally, workers and ﬁrms split the surplus from a
match by the generalized Nash bargaining solution. Workers’ bargaining power is β ∈ (0,1).
Value Functions: The present value of being unemployed is U. The present value of
being a worker in a low-skill sector i match is W L
i and working in a high-skill match is W H
i .
In the steady-state, the worker’s Bellman equations are:













i + δ[siU + λitiW
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i + δ[siU + (1 − si)W
H
i ] (4)
The interpretations are standard. In the current period, the unemployed worker receives
beneﬁts, z. With probability fi(θi) the worker matches with a ﬁrm and receives an oﬀer in
sector i. In equilibrium she accepts all job oﬀers and begins next period as a worker in a
low-skill match — the present value of which is W L
i . δ discounts next period’s payoﬀs and the
summation is over all sectors. With complementary probability the worker does not match
and remains unemployed.
For a worker in a low-skill match, the current return is the low-skill wage in sector i.
With probability si, the match separates and the worker becomes unemployed next period.
17Julien et al. (2006) and Albrecht et al. (2006) among others, address these issues.
18The worker’s probability of matching with a ﬁrm in sector i is the product of the probability of ﬁnding







10With probability λiti, the match acquires skill and produces next period as high-skill. With
complementary probability the worker keeps his current job. The interpretation is analogous
for workers in high-skill matches.
For the ﬁrm the value functions are the following, where Vi is the present value of posting
a sector i vacancy, and that of being in a low-skill and high-skill sector i job is JL
i and JH
i :
Vi = −c + δ[qi(θi)J
L







i − τ(ti) + δ[siVi + λitiJ
H









i + δ[siVi + (1 − si)J
H
i ] (7)
Using these value functions, the new match surplus, Si, is what the pair gains from
producing less what they give up, Si ≡ W L
i − U + JL
i − Vi. Nash Bargaining results in
worker’s getting their bargaining share β of surplus; the ﬁrms gets the remainder, (1−β)Si.





is similarly split, giving workers share β and ﬁrms share (1 − β).








i=1. Equilibrium wages are:
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i) − w) (8)
w
H∗
i = w + β(Aip
H
i − w) (9)





Workers receive their reservation wage, w, plus their bargaining power share β of the low
and high-skill per-period match values respectively. The worker’s reservation wage is the
value of unemployed search each period. When market conditions change in one sector, this
impacts the worker’s reservation wage, which impacts proﬁts and job creation in the rest of
the economy. This ‘reservation wage eﬀect’ causes sectoral employment and wage spillovers.
For interior solutions, when the training cost function is linear, a threshold skill arrival



















i ). Firms provide training if and only if the skill arrival rate is
suﬃciently high, λi > λi, otherwise they provide no training. Training is increasing in the
sector speciﬁc shock, Ai. This is the ‘training eﬀect’. Following a positive shock, the increase
in training accelerates skill acquisition and endogenously increases the share of high-skill
matches in the sector. This, in turn, raises productivity.
4 Applying the Model to the Canadian Data
This section applies the model to analyze Canada’s labour market adjustment. I construct
the benchmark model to represent the Canadian economy in steady-state prior to the shocks.
This environment corresponds to ‘low’ commodity prices and a ‘weak’ Canadian currency.
After imposing shocks to the model, the benchmark economy adjusts to a new steady-state,
corresponding to ‘high’ commodity prices and a ‘strong’ Canadian dollar. I demonstrate
that given shocks of a reasonable magnitude, the model’s labour adjustment captures the
empirical facts identiﬁed in Section 2.
4.1 Approach
Section 2 ﬁnds that the resource and manufacturing sectors had the largest proportional
employment responses following the shocks (Fact 1). Therefore, I focus the analysis by
considering a model economy consisting of only these two sectors, which in 2001, accounted
for 17 percent of the Canadian labour force and 23 percent of output. With two sectors, there
are 18 model parameters: {Ai,pL
i ,pH
i ,si,λi,µi,α,c,r,z,δ,β}m
i=r, where r and m subscript the
resource and manufacturing sectors. I select parameter values to match time-series sample
means and values from empirical literature. The remaining parameters are chosen so the
model’s endogenous variables match targets from the 2001 data for sectoral employment
shares, unemployment and the ratio of high-to-low skill wages in each sector. The parameter
values are described in detail below and summarized in Table 3.
124.2 Parameter Selection/Calibration
The model period represents one month.
Real Interest Rate, Discount Factor (r,δ): The monthly real interest rate is set to
r = 0.29 percent, which annualizes to 3.50 percent. Since the per-period discount rate is
δ = 1
1+r, the monthly discount rate is δ = 0.9971. The annual real interest rate target of
3.50 percent is the sample mean, ex ante real interest rate over 1991–2001, during the Bank
of Canada’s inﬂation targeting regime and before the shock.19
Separation Rates (si): The separation rates for resources and manufacturing of 3.50
percent and 1.97 percent are sample averages of the 1987–2001 time-series estimated using
the Labour Force Survey microdata, as calculated in Section 2.
Productivities (pL
i ,pH
i ): The model distinguishes ‘low’ and ‘high’ skill workers in each
sector. In the benchmark calibration, low-skill productivity is set to match the 25th per-
centile/lower quartile of the wage distribution in 2001, to represent the lower-half of the
distribution. Manufacturing is the least productive sector of the two; I normalize its low-skill
productivity to 1, pL
m = 1. From Table 2, the lower quartile manufacturing wage in 2001
is $12/hr. This wage, together with data for average hours worked in manufacturing, im-
plies a normalized unit of output represents $2064.40 in 2001 Canadian Dollars. The lower
quartile resource sector wage is $15/hr, which is 25 percent higher than in manufacturing.
Therefore, the low-skill resource productivity is pL
r = 1.25. High-skill productivities are set
so the model’s ratio of high-to-low skill wages in each sector matches the 2001 data for the
upper quartile divided by the lower quartile. This requires pH
m = 2.31 and pH
r = 2.47. In a
steady-state there are no sector-speciﬁc productivity shocks, so Ar = Am = 1.
Skill arrival rates (λi): The skill arrival rates are set such that, given the training
response, in the benchmark model’s steady-state half of the workers are low-skill and half
are high-skill, representing the two ends of the wage distribution. This requires λr = .09 and
λm = .05.
Unemployment Income (z): Rather than model Canada’s complex unemployment in-
surance scheme (which among other things, distinguishes eligibility by employment histories),
19I proxy a typical Canadian ﬁrm’s borrowing cost, beginning with the prime corporate three month
nominal interest rate (Cansim v122491) and subtracting the year-over-year percentage change in the total
CPI (Cansim v735319). This assumes agents expect no change in inﬂation.
13I exploit the model’s representative unemployed worker construct for a simple approach. The
typical replacement rate in Canada for unemployment income is 55 percent of maximum an-
nual insurable earnings — the latter remained constant at $39,000 during 2002–2006. Labour
Force Survey data show the average annual wages of full-time manufacturing and resource
workers were roughly at or above the $39,000 threshold over this period.20 Moreover, the av-
erage job durations implied by the separation rates estimated above (of 50.7 and 28.6 months
respectively for manufacturing and resources) are suﬃcient to ensure the average worker who
becomes unemployed in the model is eligible for beneﬁts — in which case she collects monthly
unemployment beneﬁts of $1787.50 = 0.55 ·
$39,000
12mns . From the normalization above, one unit
represents $2064.40, so z = 0.87 = $1787.50
$2064.40.
Recruiting Costs (c): Data on recruiting costs were collected in two large ﬁrm-level
surveys in the U.S. (the 1982 Employment Opportunity Pilot Project and the 1992 Small
Business Administration survey). From this evidence, Barron et al. (1997) and Dolﬁn (2006)
estimate that ﬁrms use, on average, between 11 and 16 labour hours to recruit, screen and
interview each new hire. Given the 2001 Labour Force Survey hours data for resource and
manufacturing sectors, this implies recruiting costs of roughly ten percent of monthly output,
so I set c=0.10. As several others have demonstrated — including Shimer (2005a); Hagedorn
and Manovskii (2006); and Mortensen and Nagyp´ al (2007), etc. — the baseline model’s
response to productivity shocks does not depend on the cost of posting a vacancy. Rather, the
key determinant is the diﬀerence between the value of market production and unemployment
income. This model feature remains intact here, so the model dynamics and steady-state
results are not sensitive to this choice.
Matching Functions (µi,α): Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) review the empirical
literature on matching function estimation. For the Cobb Douglas speciﬁcation, m(u,v) =
µuαv1−α, when m measures the outﬂow from unemployment, as in the model, they report a
“plausible” range of point estimates for α of 0.5 – 0.7. I choose the midpoint, α = 0.6.
The scale parameters on the matching functions, µi, are selected so the model generates
the target sectoral employment shares and unemployment rate from the 2001 data. For
the two-sector economy considered, resource and manufacturing employment shares are 11
20To be precise, average annual manufacturing wages were $38,940 in 2001. All other wages exceeded the
threshold.
14percent and 89 percent, respectively, and the unemployment rate is 7.7 percent. See Table 4.
Hitting these targets requires µr = 0.07 and µm = 0.26 and is computed as follows:
Steady-state conditions for each sector require the labour ﬂows into and out of unemployment
are equal: fi(θi)u = siei, or fi(θi) =
siei
u . Substituting in the targets gives equilibrium job-
ﬁnding probabilities in each sector of f∗
M = 0.21 and f∗
r = 0.05. Thus, in the model, an
unemployed worker’s monthly job-ﬁnding probability is f∗
M + f∗
r = 0.26, which is quite close
to the 0.289 estimated for Canada by Hobijn and Sahin (2007). Given α, these job-ﬁnding
probabilities, f∗
i , and a sector’s equilibrium market tightness, θ∗
i, the scale parameters on





Worker’s Share of the Match Surplus (β): I set β = 1
2, so that the ﬁrm and worker
share equally all surpluses and examine the sensitivity of the results in a subsequent section.21
4.3 Comparing the Model to the Data
This section assesses whether the model can generate labour market adjustments quanti-
tatively similar to those observed in the data, given shocks of a reasonable magnitude. I
compare the steady-states of the benchmark economy before and after shocks, and consider
transition dynamics.
The model is general and stylized. Commodity and exchange rates are not explicitly
modeled. What matters is simply that these shocks aﬀect productivity diﬀerently in the two
sectors, as discussed in Section 2. In the quantitative exercises which follow, I assume that
for the Canadian economy, these productivity changes were exogenous, unanticipated and
permanent. For Canada, it is reasonable to view as exogenous, changes in global demand and
supply in commodity and exchange rate markets and geopolitical factors. In addition, these
dramatic price movements were largely unanticipated by commodity and foreign exchange
21For the basic model, the early literature often set β = 1
2. More recently, it is common to set β = α to
satisfy the Hosios (1990) condition so that in the decentralized equilibrium, job creation, and hence produc-
tion, maximize social welfare given the matching frictions. This is no longer applicable in my model because
of the extensions of heterogenous jobs and ﬁrm-provided training. Davis (2001) shows, with heterogeneous
jobs and a single aggregate matching function, a tension exists between the worker’s bargaining power, β,
needed for the eﬃcient level of jobs and for the eﬃcient composition of jobs. While β = α provides the
correct level of jobs, too few good jobs created in the decentralized equilibrium. The rationale is similar to
here: because ﬁrm’s bear the full cost of training, but only receive share (1−β) of the increase in value their
training produces, training is less than socially-eﬃcient in the decentralized equilibrium. As β → 0, training
will increase and shift the composition of jobs towards high-skill, however, there will be too few jobs created,
so unemployment will be higher than socially optimal.
15markets. If agents had expected future increases in commodity prices and exchange rates,
they should have been reﬂected in the 2001 prices and futures contracts, but were not. Finally,
these relative price movements have been persistent — holding for six years, so far, and to
the extent Asian industrialization is responsible, one could reasonably expect this to be a
long-run phenomenon.
I use two proxies to infer the sector-speciﬁc productivity impacts of the shocks, ˆ Ai:
Shock 1: (Wage Proxy) In the model’s new steady-state, because free entry exhausts
economic proﬁts, wage growth is proportional to labour-augmenting productivity changes.
Therefore, from the wage data in Table 2, one can infer productivity changes since the shock.
These data show that average resources and manufacturing wages grew by 9.7 percent and
4.9 percent over this period, respectively. I use these to proxy the productivity shocks,
ˆ Ar = 1.097; ˆ Am = 1.049.
Shock 2: (Output per Worker Proxy) As another proxy for the productivity shock, I
use average sectoral output per worker in the ﬁve years before the shock, 1997–2001, and
ﬁve years after the shock, 2002–2006. In the latter period, output per worker rose by 6.7
percent and 4.6 percent in the resource sector and manufacturing sectors, so a second proxy
is: ˆ Ar = 1.067; ˆ Am = 1.046.
Table 4 shows the results comparing the 2006 data to the model’s new steady-states after
shocks 1 and 2. Overall, the model is broadly consistent with the facts identiﬁed in Section
2, with the wage proxy, shock 1, performing best. Consistent with Fact 1, labour reallocates
from manufacturing to resources. With the wage proxy, the model exactly predicts the
reallocation that occurred, while for the smaller output per worker proxy, the model features
considerably less reallocation than in the data (only a 0.8 percentage point reallocation in
the model versus 2.9 in the data). Figures 9 and 10 compare the model’s dynamics to data
from the payroll and labour force surveys. The model’s employment adjustment captures the
broad trends reasonably well, particularly for the payroll survey. However, the employment
movements in the labour force survey data feature a delay of roughly two years, before the
employment adjustment begins in earnest.
Second, resource ﬁrms increased hiring, while manufacturing ﬁrms reduced hirings, con-
sistent with Fact 2. By construction, separations are exogenous and constant, so the model
16has no predictions on this adjustment margin.22
Third, wage gains are larger for the resource sector and concentrated in the upper end of
the wage distribution, see Fact 3 and Table 5. The table compares the Labour Force Survey
data to an artiﬁcial cross-section generated by model simulation. Given the model’s equilib-
rium transition probabilities, I simulate the corresponding Markov chain to generate artiﬁcial
data for 10,000 workers’ employment histories. The model does a good job explaining wage
gains in the resource sector. As Table 4 shows, using the wage proxy, shock 1, the model’s
change in the high-low wage ratio in resources is close to that of the data, rising from 1.73
in the benchmark to 1.80 in the new steady-state versus the 1.81 in the data.
Furthermore, by extending the basic search and matching model to incorporate heteroge-
neous jobs and skill acquisitions, the model also captures several facts identiﬁed by empirical
labour studies which are absent in the baseline model: 1) separated workers commonly switch
sectors in their subsequent job; 2) separated workers can experience wage losses or gains in
their subsequent job; 3) high wage earners are more likely to suﬀer wage losses in their
subsequent job; and 4) wages rise with job tenure.23
Notwithstanding these successes, using these shocks, the model cannot generate the ob-
served fall in the unemployment rate over this period. This is an issue raised by Shimer
(2005a) and several others, though in a diﬀerent context, since I consider a multisector
version of the model. The reason unemployment does not fall in this application is that
employment shifts to the resource sector which has a higher separation rate than the manu-
facturing sector. In addition, the model over-estimates the wage gains for the manufacturing
sector, particularly for high-skill workers, whose actual wage gains were quite modest in the
data, see Table 5.
The model economy’s new steady state following productivity shock 1 (the wage proxy),
correctly captures the sectoral labour reallocation of the actual Canadian economy in 2006,
22In the data, however, separations fell in both sectors after the shocks. I can address this by including
the observed separation rate declines to 3.0 percent and 1.7 percent in the resources and manufacturing
sectors, averaged over the ﬁve years after the shock. This lowers the unemployment rate to 6.7 percent in
the new steady-state, bring the model closer to the data. However, because separation rates fell more in
resources, more workers move to the resource sector, whose employment share rises to 15.5 percent, so the
model over-predicts the sectoral labour reallocation.
23For U.S. evidence see, e.g. Kambourov and Manovskii (forthcoming), Farber (1999) and Topel (1993);
for Canadian evidence: Garlarneau and Stratychuck (2002).
17ﬁve years after the shock. Therefore, in the quantitative measurement exercises which follow,
I assume that this is the economy’s new steady-state after the adjustment to the higher
commodity prices and Canadian exchange rate. This allows me to isolate speciﬁc frictions
and assess the impacts of alternative policies.
5 Quantifying the Impacts of Search Frictions and Skill
Non-Transferability
In models with Walrasian labour markets, production can be reorganized in a costless and
instantaneous manner. In such an environment, after a shock or policy change occurs, the
economy moves immediately to the new steady-state. In contrast, this model environment
features two frictions that result in a costly and time-consuming adjustment process. The
ﬁrst friction is that before new matches can begin producing, agents must search to match
with new partners. The second friction is that skills acquired in a match cannot be transferred
to new matches. Therefore, when a high-skill worker loses her job, she must undergo training
to acquire new skills in her subsequent job to once again become high-skill. This section
attempts to isolate and quantify the contribution of each friction to the adjustment process.
I ﬁrst discuss steady-state eﬀects, then analyze the transition between steady-states.
5.1 Steady-State Eﬀects: Ampliﬁcation Through Skill Accumula-
tion
In the exercises which follow, I assess the impacts on the aggregate model economy using the
following summary ‘welfare’ measures and their components:
1) Social Planner’s Value: the steady-state, per-period aggregate output net of training and
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Consider ﬁrst the steady-state impacts of the ‘training eﬀect’ — i.e. the increase in a
sector’s training and skill accumulation that occurs after a positive sector-speciﬁc productiv-
ity shock. Isolating this eﬀect is accomplished by comparing the model economy’s responses
18to productivity shocks in environments with, and without, training and skill accumulation.
Table 6 reports the results. The ﬁrst column is the steady-state percent changes after the
shocks, in the model without skill accumulation; the second column is the response with skill
accumulation, and the last column isolates the steady-state eﬀects of skill accumulation.
The results reveal that extending the basic model to include skill accumulation through
on-the-job training ampliﬁes the economy’s response to productivity shocks. From the previ-
ous section, the data suggest a larger relative productivity increase in the Canadian resource
sector since 2002. After imposing these shocks, the composition of production shifts favor-
ably towards more productive matches. Not only does production shift towards the more
productive resource sector (inter-sectoral reallocation), but within both sectors, when workers
can accumulate skills, production shifts towards high-skill jobs (intra-sectoral reallocation).
This result is consistent with Keane and Prasad (1996), who ﬁnd that employment shifted
towards high-skill workers in the U.S. following earlier oil price increases. This intra-sectoral
productivity gain in the model appears new to this literature.
The positive productivity shocks impact ﬁrms’ hiring and training decisions. As resource
sector jobs are relatively more proﬁtable, there is more job posting in this sector, so over
time its share of employment increases. In addition, the shocks raise the skill premia in
both sectors (there is a bigger gain in moving from low-skill to high-skill matches), so all
ﬁrms oﬀer more training. With more training, matches acquire skills faster, increasing the
percentage of high-skill matches in the economy. Overall, training raises productivity, so even
without a change in aggregate employment, aggregate output and the welfare measures are
over three percent higher, with the training eﬀect. Finally, there are also distributional wage
eﬀects with training, as the wages of high-skill workers rise relative to low-skill workers. This
relative wage result is also consistent with Keane and Prasad’s (1996) empirical ﬁndings.
5.2 Transition Costs of Search Frictions and Skill Accumulation
The previous section establishes that ﬁrm’s job training responds to the incentives to accu-
mulate skills in a match and can, therefore, have long-run steady-state eﬀects. This section
investigates the importance of training/skill accumulation and search frictions for the tran-
sition process between steady-states. To do so, I compare the benchmark model economy
19without these frictions which adjusts to its new steady-state in one period, to the same econ-
omy which adjusts subject to these search and skill non-transferability frictions. This is the
appropriate comparison because society’s opportunity cost is what the economy is producing
during the adjustment versus what it is capable of producing after sectoral adjustment.
First, some additional information is necessary to characterize the model’s transition
dynamics between steady-states. This section provides a brief summary, Appendix C has
more details. The sector-speciﬁc productivity shocks occur at the beginning of the period.
The shocks are denoted ˆ Ai in sector i, where the hat superscript is for updated values after
the shock. Prior to production, existing matches renegotiate low and high-skill wages and
training policies in the same manner described above, but in light of the new information
about the shocks. Prior to recruitment, unmatched ﬁrms optimally update their vacancy
decisions. Because of free entry and free disposal of vacancies, the value of a vacancy is zero
for all sectors at all points in time. In Pissarides’ (2000) terminology, wages, training and
market tightness (vacancies) are ‘jump variables’ updating in the period the shock hits. Given
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Output adjusts along with employment changes.
20Table 7 reports the adjustment costs attributable to both the search and non-transferable
skill frictions. The numbers reported are the average annual deviations of variables during
the labour market adjustment, relative to their values in the new steady-state. All values are
discounted to the period of the shock, and expressed as a percent of the new steady-state.
The main ﬁnding is that the costs of reallocating labour across sectors following the shocks
are economically signiﬁcant and are incurred mainly in the ﬁrst three years. Because these
frictions imped the adjustment, social welfare measures — the social planner’s value and
social net production — are four percent, and aggregate output nearly three percent, below
their new steady-state values in the ﬁrst year after the shock. Training costs are over seven
percent above their eventual steady-state value in the ﬁrst year, as low-skill (particularly
resource) workers are trained more intensely until the stationary distribution of low-to-high
skill jobs is obtained. Finally, the full economic adjustment is time-consuming, taking over
ﬁve years to complete.
Table 8 isolates the adjustment costs attributable to search frictions alone. This is done
by computing the transition for the model without skill accumulation. The estimated costs
are much smaller, suggesting that search frictions are a minor contributor to the overall
adjustment costs. This result occurs because, in the model, the average worker ﬁnds a new
job relatively quickly so search frictions have small transitory eﬀects. Each month roughly one
quarter of unemployed workers ﬁnd a job, so workers are re-employed in 1
P
i f(θi) = 1
0.25 = 4
months, on average. Finally, comparing the model with and without skill accumulation
re-enforces the point that the training eﬀect is the model’s key source of ampliﬁcation.
In a related paper, Lee and Wolpin (2006) structurally estimate a model of the U.S. econ-
omy to analyze the costs of inter-sectoral labour mobility. Their counterfactual experiments
imply that removing their estimated inter-sectoral mobility costs, would raise the average
annual growth rate of aggregate U.S. output by 1.2 percent, over 1968–2000. Given that I
focus on the most aﬀected sectors after a particularly dramatic shock, my estimated costs of
2.8 percent output in the ﬁrst year after the shock are in-line with their results.
216 Policy Analysis: Unemployment Beneﬁts
The results suggest that these impediments to adjustment were economically signiﬁcant in
Canada during this episode. A natural next step, then, is to analyze whether policy changes
might improve the situation. This section investigates how changes in unemployment beneﬁts
impact economic allocations, social welfare, and the speed of adjustment.
As an illustrative example, I estimate the impacts of increasing unemployment beneﬁts
following the shocks, from Canada’s current replacement rate of 55 percent to 65 percent
of maximum annual insurable earnings. As social spending typically becomes entrenched,
I assume the policy change is permanent. Such policy options are often discussed during
particularly acute labour adjustments and argued for on the basis of equity considerations.24
The argument is that workers who become unemployed following shocks bear much of the
burden of adjustment, while society ultimately beneﬁts when labour reallocates to more
productive uses.
Table 9 compares the new steady-states after the shocks to the benchmark model, for the
status quo and increased unemployment beneﬁt replacement rates. The last column isolates
the impact of increasing unemployment beneﬁts. While this policy has the usual eﬀects in
a search model, quantifying the impacts is important. In addition, there are two key results
to highlight. First, the policy signiﬁcantly prolongs the economy’s adjustment. Second, the
policy encourages sectoral reallocation to the more-productive sector, generating aggregate
productivity gains.
The model mechanism driving these results is the reservation wage eﬀect. More generous
unemployment beneﬁts make unemployment less costly. Unemployed workers respond by
raising their reservation wage to accept a job. Similarly, currently employed workers have an
improved threat point in the wage bargain, so they renegotiate for higher wages. As a result,
labour is now more expensive, so given a match’s productivity, jobs are less proﬁtable. This,
in turn, discourages job creation, so recruiting costs and aggregate employment fall. Fewer
workers produce less aggregate output and cost less to train (though training intensity per
24A related policy is Trade Adjustment Assistance in the U.S. which aids manufacturing workers who
lost their jobs as a result of foreign competition. The U.S. Senate, has for some time, debated signiﬁcantly
expanding this program to include service sector workers.
22worker is unchanged). With less job creation, unemployment incidence and duration both rise
dramatically, resulting in a signiﬁcant increase in the total unemployment beneﬁts collected.
Further, lower job creation slows the adjustment process by two years. Stated diﬀerently,
with more generous beneﬁts the adjustment is 23 percent longer. This result is consistent
with empirical work for OECD countries by Scarpetta (1996). Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998)
also argue that higher unemployment beneﬁts prolong the economy’s adjustment to shocks.
Another important result is that more generous unemployment beneﬁts increase aggregate
output per worker. In the model, the economy is more productive due to a compositional
eﬀect. Recruiting and production shift towards the resource sector, which is more productive
than manufacturing. This may seem strange. In the model, because skills are not transfer-
able, unemployed workers are homogeneous regardless of their employment histories. So if
workers raise their reservation wages, one might expect this to impact both sectors symmetri-
cally. In fact, the job discouraging eﬀect of the policy is stronger in less producitive/proﬁtable
sectors. The intuition for this result carries over from the on-going debates regarding the
one-sector model.25 A shock of a given size has a larger proportional impact on ﬁrms’ proﬁts,
and therefore their vacancy posting decision, when the match surplus is small. In this case,
the shock is a change in the worker’s reservation wages and the manufacturing ﬁrms are less
productive, so their match surplus is smaller and more responsive to the shock. As Table 9
shows, vacancies fall in both sectors with more generous beneﬁts, but they fall more in the
manufacturing sector. As a result, the composition of remaining job postings shifts towards
the more-productive resource sector. Over time, as the resource sector hires a larger share
of new workers, employment and production shift to resources making the economy more
productive, with output per worker rising 0.6 percent.
All things considered, does this policy change improve social welfare? The social planner’s
value is one percent higher, however, this is somewhat misleading because it arises solely from
higher unemployment income. In reality, more generous unemployment beneﬁts ultimately
require higher taxes, and these considerations are absent in the model. Indeed, once unem-
ployment beneﬁts are removed, the more generous beneﬁts lower social net production by
over one percent, so society is ultimately worse oﬀ.
25See Shimer (2005a); Hagedorn and Manovskii (2006); and Mortensen and Nagyp´ al (2007), among others.
23Not everyone, however, is worse oﬀ from this policy change. Despite less aggregate pro-
duction and income, workers take a larger share of overall income. So those who are employed
are better oﬀ and those that are unemployed are receiving higher beneﬁts. The policy also
has mild distributional eﬀects, compressing the wage structure, as low-skill workers’ wages
rise relative to those of high-skill workers.
In this example, because I perform a counterfactual experiment that never occurred, one
cannot assess whether the model matches observed data. Nonetheless, the model’s unemploy-
ment response to changes in the replacement rate is quantitatively consistent with empirical
estimates that use cross-country regression for panels of OECD economies. The estimates
of the semi-elasticity of unemployment rate with respect to unemployment beneﬁt replace-
ment rate range from .011–.024.26 In my model the result is .016, falling safely in the range
of plausible estimates. When the replacement rate increases by 18 percent, (10 percentage
points, from 55 percent to 65 percent) the unemployment rate rises by 21 percent, or 1.6
percentage points.
This is not only reassuring that the quantitative result are reasonable, but relates to a
general problem with the baseline one-sector search and matching model. Essentially, the cal-
ibrated model can either match unemployment’s response to productivity or unemployment’s
response to unemployment beneﬁts, but not both. For instance, if the model’s unemploy-
ment responds enough to productivity shock to match the data, then it is much too sensitive
to changes in unemployment beneﬁts. This is issue was recently noted by several authors
including: Hornstein, Krusell, and Violante (2005); Costain and Reiter (2006); and Silva
and Toledo (2007). Section 4 demonstrates that my results are consistent with the sectoral
employment data. It is noteworthy then, that my model simultaneously matches sectoral em-
ployment responses to productivity shocks and unemployment’s response to unemployment
beneﬁts.
7 Robustness of Results to Parameter Selection
This section assesses the sensitivity of the results to diﬀerent parameter choices for values
that were taken from the literature or preselected. I ﬁnd that varying the matching function
26Nickell and Laynard (1999) and Costain and Reiter (2006).
24elasticity (with respect to unemployment) in the range found in Pissarides and Petrongolo’s
(2001) survey of the empirical literature has negligible impacts on the estimated adjustment
costs. The welfare measures rise or fall by at most 0.2 percent during the transition. Large
changes in the cost of posting a vacancy also do not materially change the results. They
simply scale vacancies but does not change their proportional response.
Finally, I analyze the sensitivity of the results to the worker’s bargaining power parame-
ter, β. This change directly impacts the ﬁrm’s share of the surplus and, therefore, aﬀects the
incentives for job creation. If workers bargaining power rises above 0.6, then workers’ reser-
vation wages increase to the point that manufacturing production is no longer proﬁtable.
Obviously, in this parametrization, a large β is inconsistent with the data. Alternatively,
Hagedorn and Manovskii (2006), for example, choose a much smaller value of β = 0.05,
based on the cyclicality of real wages. This parameterization, gives ﬁrms the vast majority,
95 percent, of match surpluses. Overall, this change moves the model farther away from
matching the employment and wage data. Nonetheless, the welfare and output costs from
labour adjustment remain sizeable.
However, there is much less sectoral reallocation following the shocks, so the implied
adjustment costs fall. With a small β, workers wages are lower and the high-low wage ratio
is much more compressed. Because ﬁrms keep almost all of the skill premium — the gain
in match value when moving from a low to high-skill match — they increase job creation
and training in the benchmark model, prior to the shocks. In fact, in the benchmark model,
ﬁrms train workers as much as possible (there is a corner solution at 1). As a result, there is
no ampliﬁcation following the productivity shock because training cannot increase further.
With less ampliﬁcation, the steady-state impacts are reduced. In addition, without the
training eﬀect, the economy reaches its new steady state much quicker, which implies lower
adjustment costs. For example, in the ﬁrst year following the shock, the welfare costs (as
measured by the social planner’s value) fall from 4 percent when β = 0.5, to 1.2 percent
when β = 0.05.
258 Conclusions and Future Work
This paper studies the process of sectoral labour reallocation at an aggregate level. I ﬁnd
that there can be considerable adjustment costs during the transition for particular sectors
and the aggregate economy. Researchers generally accept that sectoral job changes can be
costly for individual workers, largely because some skills are lost in the transition. A key
contribution of this paper is to quantitatively demonstrate a logical implication of this fact:
During sectoral reallocations large numbers of workers make sectoral job changes, so this
inability to transfer skills between jobs is a key contributor to the aggregate costs of sectoral
labour adjustments.
I analyzed the sectoral labour adjustment in Canada after the increase in commodity
prices and associated exchange rate appreciation, which began in 2002. Popular discussions of
this episode typically emphasize job losses from layoﬀs in the manufacturing sector. However,
my analysis suggests the reason manufacturing employment fell so dramatically was not
because of an unusually high rate of job loss (i.e., separations). Instead, the cause for concern
is the weak job creation, which was entirely responsible for the fall in employment.
I used a multisector labour search and matching model to analyze factors which impede
adjustment. The model did a good job explaining key features of the adjustment. When
calibrated to the Canadian data, the model estimated that the costs of adjustment during this
episode were as high as three percent of output. These costs were mainly attributable to skill
loss due to job turnover. Finally, increasing unemployment beneﬁts in model were shown to
reduce employment, output and social welfare. However, such a policy would likely increase
the composition of high-productivity jobs in the economy and raise output per worker.
Several extensions are possible in future work. One is to repeat the quantitative analysis
with a third sector to capture movements to the rest of the economy. Another is to add
physical capital to the model. This seems important because in the data, the resource sector
experienced not only a large increase in labour, but also a large increase in capital per worker
following the commodity price shock. I would also like to consider the impacts of policies
that increase the incentives for training displaced workers. Another potential application
of this model is to assess whether the aggregate costs of recent energy price shocks have
lessened compared to the episodes in the 1970s, as recent research by Blanchard and Gali
26(2007) suggests that the aggregate eﬀects of energy price shocks have changed considerably
over time. Finally, because sectoral compositions diﬀer signiﬁcantly across regions within
an economy, sector-speciﬁc shocks are often regional shocks. In future research, I plan to
study regional responses and migration after shocks. With suitable modiﬁcations, the basic
framework in this paper seems well-suited to address these issues, such as making skills
transferable across regions, including direct labour mobility costs, and allowing workers to
choose the regions where they search for work.
27Appendix
A Tables
Table 1: Exposure to Exchange Rate Movements by Industry, Canada 2002
(1) Export (2) Import (3) Imported Trade Exposure
Industry Orientation Competition Inputs (1)+(2)-(3)
Manufacturing 0.52 0.48 0.24 0.76
Primary 0.44 0.25 0.08 0.61
Resources 0.40 0.24 0.14 0.50
Accommodation & Food 0.17 0.19 0.05 0.31
Business Services & Transportation 0.14 0.09 0.04 0.19
Construction 0.00 0.00 0.12 -0.12
Private Sector 0.27 0.31 0.11 0.48
Source: Dion (2000) and updated Bank of Canada calculations. Export orientation and imported inputs are
expressed as a share of the sector’s gross output (which includes domestic and foreign sales). Imported competition
measures imports as a share of the domestic market. With an appreciation, the change in relative prices makes
exports more expensive and imports cheaper. Therefore, sectors are more exposed to exchange rate movements
when exporting more of their goods, and when facing more import competition in the domestic market. A beneﬁt
of the appreciation is cheaper imported inputs, so this is subtracted in the overall trade exposure measure.
28Table 2: Distribution of Real Wage Gains, 2006 vs. 2001
Annualized Hourly Wage Percentage
Wage Gain 2001 2006 Change
Resources
Lower Quartile $1,929 $ 15.00 $ 15.59 4.0%
Median $4,750 $ 20.19 $ 21.97 8.8%
Upper Quartile $5,980 $ 25.96 $ 28.19 8.6%
Mean $5,435 $ 21.30 $ 23.37 9.7%
Number of Observations 16, 407 18, 241
Manufacturing
Lower Quartile $646 $ 12.00 $ 12.37 3.1%
Median $971 $ 16.40 $ 16.95 3.4%
Upper Quartile $663 $ 22.50 $ 22.91 1.8%
Mean $1,594 $ 18.04 $ 18.92 4.9%
Number of Observations 96, 260 84, 714
Note: Lower quartile, median and upper quartile are the 25th, 50th and 75th per-
centiles respectively. Source: Labour Force Survey (LFS) Public Use Microdata
ﬁles. Observations weighted by LFS frequency weights. Real hourly earnings,
2001 Canadian dollars deﬂated using the CPI. Annualized Wage Gain is the
diﬀerence in annual wage earnings in 2001 and 2006. Annual wage earnings
multiply average actual hours worked per year in the sector by the real hourly
wage. The hours series are from Cansim and cover all workers (Manufacturing,
v2641791; Resources, v2641755)
29Table 3: Parameter Values for the Benchmark Model
Variable Parameter Value Target
Real Interest Rate r 0.29% Sample mean Canadian data
Discount Factor δ 0.997 δ = 1
1+r
Resource Separation Rate sr 3.50% Labour Force Survey (LFS) microdata
Manuf. Separation Rate sm 1.97% LFS microdata
Resource Low-Skill Productivity pL
r 1.25 LFS wage data
Manuf. Low-Skill Productivity pL
m 1.0 LFS wage data, normalization
Unemployment Income z 0.87 55% Maximum Insurable Earnings
Matching Function Elasticity α 0.6 Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001)
Recruiting Cost c 0.1 Dolﬁn (2006); Barron et al. (1997)
Workers’ Bargaining Power β 0.5 Equal split of surplus
Resource Productivity Shock AR 1.0 Steady-state
Manuf. Productivity Shock AM 1.0 Steady-state
Scale Parameter on Matching Fx. µr 0.07 LFS Resource Employment
Scale Parameter on Matching Fx. µm 0.26 LFS Manufacturing Employment
Resource High-Skill ‘Output’ pH
r 2.47 LFS High-low wage ratio
Manuf. High-Skill ‘Output’ pH
m 2.31 LFS High-low wage ratio
Resource Skill Arrival Rate λr 0.09 1
2 High-low skill Employment
Manuf. Skill Arrival Rate λm 0.05 1
2 High-low skill Employment
Model Period = 1 Month
Table 4: Comparing Model to Data, Target Variables in the Bench-
mark and New Steady-State
Benchmark New Steady-State
2001 2006 Shock 1 Shock 2
Data Model Data Model Model
Employment Share
Resources 11.0 11.0 13.9 13.9 11.8
Manufacturing 89.0 89.0 86.1 86.1 88.2
Unemployment Rate 7.7 7.7 5.4 7.7 7.3
High-Low Skill Wage Ratio
Resources 1.73 1.73 1.81 1.80 1.77
Manufacturing 1.88 1.88 1.85 1.90 1.90
Note: First column of numbers are the 2001 benchmark targets. The second column
is the calibrated benchmark model. The third column are the 2006 new steady-state
data targets. The fourth column, labeled Shock 1, is the new steady state using the
wage proxy for productivity shocks: Ar = 1.097;Am = 1.049. The ﬁfth column, labeled
Shock 2, is the new state using the output per worker proxy for the productivity shocks:
Ar = 1.067;Am = 1.046.
30Table 5: Distribution of Real Wage Gains By Sector, Model-
Generated vs. Data
Data Model
Annualized Percentage Annualized Percentage
Wage Gain Change Wage Gain Change
Resources
Lower Quartile $ 1,929 4.0% $ 1,472 5.4%
Upper Quartile $ 5,980 8.6% $ 4,415 9.4%
Mean $ 5,435 9.7% $ 4,098 11.4%
Manufacturing
Lower Quartile $ 646 3.1% $ 1,252 5.2%
Upper Quartile $ 663 1.8% $ 2,829 6.3%
Mean $ 1,594 4.9% $ 2,666 7.9%
Note: Data are from Author’s calculations using Labour Force Survey Public Use
Microdata Files. See Table 2 for further details. Model: I simulate the benchmark
and new steady-state models to generate artiﬁcial data on worker’s employment
histories. Given these work histories, I compute annual incomes for workers. Each
artiﬁcial sample has 10, 000 workers.
31Table 6: Isolating and Quantifying the Steady-State Skill Eﬀect
No Skill Skill Skill
Aggregate Impacts Accumulation Accumulation Eﬀect
Social Planners Value (a+b-c-d) 5.4 8.7 3.2
Social Net Production (a-c-d) 5.7 9.1 3.4
Workers Expected Income 5.4 8.7 3.3
a) Output 5.9 9.3 3.4
b) Unemployment Beneﬁts -0.4 0.4 0.8
c) Training Costs 0.0 8.1 8.1
d) Recruiting Costs 11.9 25.2 13.3
Employment 0.0 0.0 0.0
% High-Skill 0.0 4.0 4.0
Output per Worker 5.9 9.4 3.5
Reservation Wage 5.4 8.7 3.3
Unemployment -0.4 0.4 0.8
Une Duration (months) -0.1 -0.1 0.0
Sectoral Impacts
Output - Resources 30.7 44.5 13.8
Manufacturing 2.5 4.4 2.0
Employment - Resources 19.1 26.2 7.1
Manufacturing -2.3 -3.3 -0.9
% High Skill - Resources 0.0 7.0 7.0
Manufacturing 0.0 4.0 4.0
Proﬁts - Resources 30.8 41.0 10.2
Manufacturing -2.9 -5.4 -2.5
Market Tightness - Resources 56.4 77.3 20.9
Manufacturing -4.8 -8.9 -4.1
Distributional Impacts
Low-Skill Wages - Resources 7.8 5.4 -2.3
Manufacturing 5.2 5.2 0.1
High-Skill Wages - Resources 8.1 9.4 1.3
Manufacturing 5.1 6.3 1.2
Note: The ﬁrst two columns report the percentage change in the variables relative to their
benchmark models. The last column subtracts the results without skills from the model
with skills to isolate the steady-state eﬀects. The ﬁrst column without skills is: (2) - (1),






2 ;Ar = 1.097,Am = 1.049;






2 ;Ai = 1; The second column with
skills is: (4) - (3), where (4) the new steady-state with skills λr = 0.09;λm = 0.05;Ar =
1.097,Am = 1.049; and (3) is the benchmark with skills λr = 0.09;λm = 0.05;Ai = 1.
32Table 7: Adjustment Costs Attributable to Search Fric-
tions and Non-Transferable Skills (Discounted and Expressed
in Percent)
Years After the Shock
1 2 3 5 7
Social Planner’s Value (a+b-c-d) 4.0 2.1 1.1 0.2 0.0
Social Net Product (a-c-d) 4.2 2.2 1.1 0.2 0.0
Worker’s Expected Income 2.1 1.1 0.5 0.1 0.0
a) Aggregate Output 2.8 1.5 0.8 0.2 0.0
b) Unemployment Beneﬁts 1.2 1.2 0.8 0.3 0.1
c) Training Costs 7.3 4.0 1.9 0.4 0.0
d) Recruiting Costs -1.1 -1.2 -0.8 -0.3 -0.2
Note: Compares a model economy that adjusts without frictions and
training to the new steady-state following the wage proxy productivity
shocks: Ar = 1.097;Am = 1.049, to an economy subject to search and
training frictions. The numbers reported are the average annual devia-
tions of variables during the labour market adjustment relative to their
values in the new steady-state. All values are discounted to the period of
the shock, and expressed as a percent of the new steady-state.
Table 8: Adjustment Costs Attributable to Search
Frictions (Discounted and Expressed in Percent)
Years After the Shock
1 2 3 5 7
Social Planner’s Value 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
Social Net Product 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
Worker’s Expected Income 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Aggregate Output 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
Unemployment Beneﬁts 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.2 0.1
Training Costs – – – – –
Recruiting Costs -0.6 -0.9 -0.6 -0.3 -0.1
Note: Compares a model economy that adjusts without frictions
and skill accumulation to the new steady-state following the wage
proxy productivity shocks: Ar = 1.097;Am = 1.049, to an econ-







numbers reported are the average annual deviations of variables
during the labour market adjustment relative to their values in the
new steady-state. All values are discounted to the period of the
shock, and expressed as a percent of the new steady-state.
33Table 9: Steady-State Impacts of Increased Unemployment Insurance
New Steady-State New Steady-State EI
Aggregate Impacts Benchmark Status Quo EI More Generous EI Eﬀect
Social Planner’s Value (a+b-c-d) 100 108.7 109.7 1.0
Social Net Production (a-c-d) 100 109.1 108.0 -1.1
Worker’s Expected Income 100 108.7 109.9 1.2
a) Output 100 109.3 108.0 -1.4
b) Unemployment Beneﬁts 100 100.4 143.5 43.1
c) Training Costs 100 108.1 106.3 -1.8
d) Recruiting Costs 100 125.2 115.3 -9.9
Employment 100 100.0 98.2 -1.8
% High-Skill 50.0 54.2 54.2 0.0
Output per Worker 100 109.4 109.9 0.6
Reservation Wage 100 108.7 110.0 1.3
Unemployment 100 100.4 121.4 21.0
Une Duration (months) 3.9 3.8 4.6 0.8
Sectoral Impacts
Output - Resources 100 144.5 169.9 25.4
Manufacturing 100 104.4 99.4 -5.1
Employment - Resources 100 126.2 148.4 22.2
Manufacturing 100 96.7 92.0 -4.7
% High Skill - Resources 50.0 56.7 56.7 0.0
Manufacturing 50.0 53.8 53.8 0.0
Proﬁts - Resources 100 141.0 135.2 -5.8
Manufacturing 100 94.6 66.0 -28.6
Market Tightness - Resources 100 177.3 165.3 -12.1
Manufacturing 100 91.1 50.0 -41.1
Distributional Impacts
Low-Skill Wages - Resources 100 105.4 106.2 0.8
Manufacturing 100 105.2 106.1 0.9
High-Skill Wages - Resources 100 109.4 109.8 0.5
Manufacturing 100 106.3 106.8 0.5
Transition Eﬀects
Time to Full Convergence (yrs) – 8.6 10.6 2.0
Note: The relevant variables in the benchmark steady-state are normalized to 100. Compares steady-states with
Status Quo: 55% and More Generous: 65% unemployment beneﬁt replacement rate (of normalized output).
34B Figures
Figure 1: Bank of Canada Commodity Price Index and Energy Subindex, 1981–
2006
BCPI All Items BCPI Energy








Source: Bank of Canada. The Bank of Canada Commodity Price Index is a ﬁxed-weight index of the spot
or transaction prices of 23 commodities produced in Canada and sold in world markets. Each commodity’s
index weight is based on the average value of its Canadian production over the 1988-1999 period. The series
are indexed to 1982–1990 = 100 in U.S. dollar terms.
35Figure 2: Canadian Nominal Eﬀective Exchange Rate, 1981–2006









Source: Bank of Canada. The nominal eﬀective exchange rate uses multilateral trade weights for the six
currencies of countries or economic zones with the largest share of Canada’s international trade. For more
information on its construction see Ong (2006). The average value of the index is 100 in 1992.
Figure 3: Relative Employment Changes, Canada 2002–2006, SEPH Payroll Survey



























Source: Cansim, Survey of Employment, Payrolls and Hours (SEPH), seasonally adjusted employment.
Manufacturing v1596771. Mining and oil and gas extraction v1596768. Rest of Economy = Industrial
aggregate excluding unclassiﬁed, v1596764, less manufacturing and mining, oil and gas employment.














































































































































































Data Source: Cansim. Output is GDP at basic prices, Table 3790019; Employment is from the Labour force
survey, Table 2820094
Figure 5: Resource Sector Job-Finding and Separation Rates, 1993–2006





















































Data Source: Labour Force Survey Public Use Microdata ﬁles. I estimate total employment outﬂows in each
sector by aggregating individuals’ (frequency-weighted) employment-to-unemployment transitions. Given the
employment and unemployment series, equation (1) gives the job-ﬁnding and separation rate estimates. Note
the job-ﬁnding estimates assume that all net inﬂows into the sector were from unemployment rather than
labour force inactivity or job-to-job transitions from other sectors.
37Figure 6: Manufacturing Sector Job-Finding and Separation Rates, 1993–2006























































Data Source: Labour Force Survey Public Use Microdata ﬁles. I estimate total employment outﬂows in each
sector by aggregating individuals’ (frequency-weighted) employment-to-unemployment transitions. Given the
employment and unemployment series, equation (1) gives the job-ﬁnding and separation rate estimates. Note
the job-ﬁnding estimates assume that all net inﬂows into the sector were from unemployment rather than
labour force inactivity or job-to-job transitions from other sectors.
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Real Hourly Wage
2001 2006
Wage Distributions: Resource Sector
Source: Labour Force Survey Public Use Microdata Files. Kernel density estimates of 2001 and 2006 surveys,
Hourly Earnings variable for workers in the Oil & Gas; Forestry; Fishing; and Mining sectors. The solid
line shows 2001, the year prior to the shock; the dashed line shows 2006, the latest available data. I deﬂate
nominal earning using the Consumer Price Index. The estimation applies the Epanenchiknov smoothing
kernel with optimal weights from Silverman (1986).




























0 20 40 60
Real Hourly Wage
2001 2006
Wage Distributions: Manufacturing Sector
Source: Labour Force Survey Public Use Microdata Files. Kernel density estimates of 2001 and 2006 surveys,
Hourly Earnings variable for workers in the Manufacturing sector. The solid line shows 2001, the year prior
to the shock; the dashed line shows 2006, the latest available data. I deﬂate nominal earnings using the
Consumer Price Index. The estimation applies the Epanenchiknov smoothing kernel with optimal weights
from Silverman (1986).
Figure 9: Employment Dynamics Model vs. Data, 2002–2006, SEPH Payroll Survey



























39Figure 10: Employment Dynamics Model vs. Data, 2002–2006, LFS Data





























The shock, denoted ˆ Ai,t, hits at the beginning of period t, where the hat superscript denotes
an updated value. With free entry and exit of vacancies and costless renegotiation of labour
contracts conditional on the new sector-speciﬁc state, training, market tightness and wages
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Notice these variables can jump to their new values because they do not depend directly on
employment and unemployment levels. Given these new wages and transition probabilities,
the value functions also discretely update in period t. For example, in period t prior to the
shock, the present value of being unemployed is:
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40After the shock in period t, the value of unemployment updates immediately to:
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And similarly for the other value functions which are now:
ˆ W
L
i,t = ˆ w
L∗
i,t + δEˆ t[si(ˆ Ut+1 − ˆ W
L




i,t+1 − ˆ W
L





i,t = ˆ w
H∗
i,t + δEˆ t[si(ˆ Ut+1 − ˆ W
H
i,t+1) + ˆ W
H
i,t+1]




i,t+1 − ˆ Vi,t+1) + ˆ Vi,t+1]
ˆ J
L
i,t = ˆ Ai,tp
L
i − ˆ w
L∗
i,t − τ(ˆ t
∗
i,t) + δEˆ t[si(ˆ Vi,t+1 − ˆ J
L




i,t+1 − ˆ J
L





i,t = ˆ Ai,tp
H
i − ˆ w
H∗
i,t + δEˆ t[si(ˆ Vi,t+1 − ˆ J
H
i,t+1) + ˆ J
H
i,t+1]
Free entry and exit of vacancies implies ˆ Vi,t = ˆ Vi,t+1 = 0. Nash Bargaining implies
ˆ JL
i,t = (1 − β)ˆ Si,t and ( ˆ W L


















Other variables, such as employment and unemployment, evolve more slowly to their new
steady-state values according to the following diﬀerence equations:
ˆ e
L
i,t+1 = fi(ˆ θ
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A stable transition requires that each sector’s market tightness updates immediately to its
new steady-state value, ˆ θ∗
i,t. However, since θi,t ≡
vi,t
ut , vacancies overshoot their steady-state
level and move in the same direction as unemployment so that market tightness remains
constant at its new value during the transition. See Pissarides (1985) or (2000, Ch. 1.7).
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